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Abstract
When ﬁrms in the same industry located in diﬀerent regions or countries expe-
rience shocks to production costs in their respective industries that are imperfectly
correlated, arbitrage opportunities automatically lead to trade. Trade can either
stabilize or destabilize the price faced by producers in a given country. Producers’
surplus is aﬀected due to the “variance-covariance” eﬀect, while consumers’ surplus
is more directly aﬀected through the variance of the product price. The paper ex-
amines how consumers’ surplus, producers’ surplus and social welfare are aﬀected
when the regions switch from autarky to free trade in the presence of industry
and region-speciﬁc cost shocks. Contrary to Anderson et al. (1989) and Moner-
Colonques (1998), under Cournot competition, when the industries are symmetric
in the two regions, producers’ surplus can increase in both regions in the switch
from autarky to trade. In general, depending on the variance of the cost shocks in
the two regions, the correlation coeﬃcient between the shocks, and the number of
ﬁrms, producers’ and consumers’ surplus in a given country can be either higher
or lower under trade compared to autarky. However, social welfare is higher in
both regions under a surprisingly robust set of conditions. Contrary to traditional
trade theory, the gain in social welfare in several situations is due to the gains in
producers’ surplus oﬀsetting the loss in consumers’ surplus.
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1. Introduction
Traditional trade theory implies that one of the major beneﬁts associated with the move-
ment of goods between regions is due to greater specialization in accordance with the
principle of comparative advantage. Recent trade theory, on the other hand, notes that
a large volume of trade takes place between regions with similar resource endowments
and is intra-industry in nature. Intra-industry trade is explained in terms of increasing
returns to scale, and one of the main beneﬁts of intra-industry trade is greater product
variety enjoyed by consumers.
In this paper, we analyze the welfare consequences of intra-industry trade between
regions when the regions are subject to imperfectly correlated production or cost shocks.
Examples of such shocks could be weather uncertainties aﬀecting agriculture and agro-
based industries, interruptions in supply such as the recent power outages in California,
labor disputes, changes in commodity tax rates, oil price shocks, and, for countries, ex-
change rate changes that aﬀect the cost of imported inputs, or macro-economic shocks
that aﬀect wages and prices in the economy.
Trade between regions would occur in the presence of these shocks for a simple reason:
imperfectly correlated regional shocks would result in price diﬀerentials in local markets
which present arbitrage opportunities. Goods would move from regions with low prices
to those with high prices and in the process reduce the price divergence between regions.
Somewhat surprisingly, the welfare consequences of such arbitrage have not received much
attention in the trade literature. One notable exception is Newbery and Stiglitz (1981),
who argue that trade motivated by such arbitrage opportunities can be Pareto inferior if
both producers (farmers in their model) and consumers are risk-averse.
For Newbery and Stiglitz (1981), the focus was the eﬀect of stabilization policies on
the welfare of farmers and the assumption of risk-aversion is very reasonable in that
context. However, when manufacturing ﬁrms in the same industry in diﬀerent regions are
subject to shocks which aﬀect all ﬁrms in the industry in the same region but not in the
other region (i.e. the shocks are industry and region-speciﬁc), then risk-neutrality may
be a better assumption. The shareholders of the ﬁrms should be able to diversify away
the shocks that are speciﬁc to their industries and therefore can be treated as eﬀectively
risk-neutral. One then has to address the welfare issues from this standpoint.1
1Moreover, the source of uncertainty in Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) is random firm output. In our
model, output will be chosen after (cost) uncertainty is realized. As will be clear below, this has important
implications for the impact of uncertainty and trade on the expected producers’ surplus.
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Existing empirical evidence shows that price diﬀerentials dissipate reasonably quickly
within regions in the same country, but not so across borders (see, for example, Parsley
and Wei (1996) for evidence on the speed of convergence of prices in U.S. cities, and Engel
and Rogers (1996) for the so-called “border eﬀect” between prices in U.S. and Canadian
cities across the U.S.-Canada border). The reasons for the border-eﬀect are not very
well understood as yet; however, we believe that it is important to ask the normative
question as to whether market integration — if it could be achieved — is desirable, and
what its possible impact might be on consumers and producers of the regions. It is also
important to note that price convergence has been a key issue surrounding the European
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The President of the European Central Bank
stated recently:
Price level convergence could be expected to take place in the euro area for
at least two reasons. First, the completion of the internal market and increased
cross-border price transparency contribute to eroding the scope for the existence of
substantial price diﬀerentials for products which are easily tradable across borders.
To a large extent, this may have taken place already before the start of Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU), but diﬀerences remain. One example of such a price
convergence that has attracted public attention relates to car prices. Secondly, with
regard to goods and services which are less easily tradable across national borders
(such as housing and hairdressing), the long-term convergence of productivity and
living standards across the euro area would create a tendency towards price level
convergence.2
The issue of how, in the presence of oligopolistic competition, the opening up of trade
aﬀects intra-industry trade ﬂows and the welfare of producers, consumers and society,
has been addressed in a number of papers (see, for example, Markusen (1981), Brander
and Krugman (1983), Helpman (1984), Helpman and Krugman (1985)). Helpman and
Krugman (1985) show that when countries diﬀer in more than one respect, the direction
of trade ﬂow is not necessarily from the country with low pre-trade price to the one with
higher pre-trade price. They also show that opening up of trade has a “pro-competitive”
eﬀect, leading to a reduction in monopoly distortions and gains from trade over and
above the competitive model. Anderson, Donsimoni and Gabszewicz (1989) address the
impact of opening up of trade (or, equivalently in their models, market integration) on the
2Speech by Willem F. Duisenberg, President of the European Central Bank, at the Financial Services
Industry Association, Dublin, 6 September, 2000.
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proﬁts of ﬁrms in oligopolistic industries. Anderson et al.(1989) point out that there are
two oﬀsetting eﬀects of market integration. Firms in each region gain from selling their
products in foreign markets. However, they also face greater competition from the output
of ﬁrms in the other region. Anderson et al. (1989) ﬁnd that in general, the total proﬁts
of ﬁrms from at least one region will decrease, and if the regional markets are symmetric,
ﬁrms in both regions will attain lower proﬁts.
The main diﬀerence between the partial equilibrium framework in some of the papers
mentioned above and ours is in the introduction of uncertainty. In Helpman and Krug-
man’s (1985) framework, for example, there will be no trade if the countries are otherwise
symmetric (however, the possibility of trade will still have a “pro-competitive eﬀect”). In
our framework, even if the countries are otherwise identical, the realization of the random
cost shock may be diﬀerent, and thus trade will occur. The ex-ante welfare consequences
of trade when markets are opened up to eliminate price diﬀerentials is the main focus
of our paper. We ﬁnd that in the presence of uncertainty, there are additional welfare
eﬀects over and above the “pro-competitive” eﬀect that the existing literature has mainly
emphasized. If the variance of the cost shocks is suﬃciently large, the additional eﬀects
will dominate the “pro-competitive” eﬀects.
Moner-Colonques (1998), like us, also introduces cost uncertainty. Each ﬁrm has a cost
shock that is private information to that ﬁrm, and it knows the distribution from which
other ﬁrms’ cost shocks are drawn. Moner-Colonques (1998) ﬁnds that if the variance of
the cost shock is suﬃciently high, ﬁrms from one of the regions will beneﬁt. However, it is
never possible, in the symmetric case, for ﬁrms in both regions to beneﬁt. Our framework
has two main diﬀerences with Moner-Colonques (1998).3 First, we assume that ﬁrms
within the same region experience the same shock, but these shocks are imperfectly cor-
related across regions. Second, we do not assume that the shocks are private information
— in fact, the shocks are assumed to be common knowledge and the output decisions are
taken after the shocks are realized. We ﬁnd that in the symmetric case, as long as the cost
shocks across regions are not perfectly correlated, a suﬃciently high variance of the shock
would increase the proﬁts of ﬁrms in both regions under trade (or market integration)4
3As in Moner-Colonques (1998), our analysis is also carried out in a framework of linear demand and
marginal cost curves.
4It is useful to point out here that for the particular demand functions considered in this paper and
in Moner-Colonques (1998), “trade” (referring , in the above two papers, to a situation where firms in
each region are free to sell in either market, but the markets are segmented in the sense that consumer
arbitrage is not possible) and “market integration” (referring to a situation where a single price prevails
in an integrated market) imply the same equilibrium. See Anderson et. al. (1989), page 731.
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compared to autarky. This is diﬀerent from the results of both Anderson et al. (1989)
as well as Moner-Colonques (1998). Moreover, unlike these two papers, we also carry out
a full welfare analysis. We ﬁnd that in the symmetric case, social welfare improves from
market integration in both regions. Even in the asymmetric case, the conditions required
for social welfare to decrease in any country are rather stringent. Further, social welfare
must be higher in at least one region.
To understand the way in which trade can change the exposure to uncertainty faced by
producers and consumers and thus aﬀect their welfare, it is useful to consider a situation in
which the “pro-competitive” eﬀect is absent, i.e. ﬁrms are price takers. Accordingly, our
analysis begins with the case of price-taking ﬁrms. In the absence of trade, the country-
speciﬁc cost shocks induce variability in the industry price. We show that the impact of
variability of price on expected proﬁt can be decomposed into two terms: the variance
of price, which aﬀects the expected proﬁt of ﬁrms positively, and the covariance of the
price with the cost shock faced by the ﬁrm, which aﬀects its expected proﬁt negatively
(the collective eﬀect is referred to as the “variance-covariance eﬀect” in the subsequent
analysis). Trade aﬀects the variability of the price as the price is now a function of the
cost shocks of both regions. However, trade also reduces the covariance between the price
and a ﬁrm’s own cost shock. Trade aﬀects the welfare of consumers more directly because
the indirect utility function of consumers is quasi-convex in prices, so that consumers
prefer a more variable price to a less variable one. We ﬁnd that social welfare is higher
with trade than under autarky for each region, irrespective of the variance of the shocks.
One interesting diﬀerence of our ﬁndings with the existing literature is that although
the classical gains from trade result holds for both countries in general, the internal
distribution of gains and losses is reversed. Both traditional trade theory based on perfect
competition and new trade theory based on imperfect competition show that the gains
from trade are driven by gains to consumers. In our setting, however, the gain in social
welfare in several situations is due to the gains in producers’ surplus oﬀsetting the loss in
consumers’ surplus.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The basic model is introduced in section
2. We then analyze how trade aﬀects the welfare of consumers and producers and the
social welfare under perfect competition (section 3) and Cournot competition (section 4).
Finally, we conclude in section 5. Some of the detailed derivations are relegated to the
appendix.
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2. The Basic Model
We consider two countries5, Home and Foreign, which are characterized by an identical
number of ﬁrms, n, producing a homogeneous product. Each domestic ﬁrm has the
following cost function:
C(q) = αq + wq +
β
2
q2.
Similarly, each foreign ﬁrm has the following cost function:
C∗(q∗) = αq∗ + w∗q∗ +
β
2
q∗2.
w and w∗ are two random variables representing cost shocks with E(w) = E(w∗) = 0,
E(w2) = σ2, E(w∗2) = σ∗2, and Corr(w,w∗) = ρ. Production takes place after w and w∗
are realized. The demand for the good in both the Home country and the Foreign country
is given by
Q =
1
b
(a− p).
The basic reason why trade aﬀects welfare in this environment is that it aﬀects the
exposure of producers and consumers to uncertainty. Let us go one step back and try to
understand ﬁrst how the producers and consumers react to the exposure to uncertainty.
Since the shocks aﬀect the marginal costs of ﬁrms, equilibrium price also depends
on the realization of the cost shocks, p = p(w).6 Given w, the consumers’ surplus is
CS =
1
2b
(a− p(w))2, and its expected value is
E(CS) =
1
2b
[
a2 + V ar(p)−E(p) (2a− E(p))
]
. (1)
Thus, expected consumers’ surplus increases with the variance of price, that is, consumers
prefer the price to be more variable, and decreases with the expected price.
The eﬀect of cost uncertainty on an individual producer’s expected proﬁt is not that
straightforward; there is a trade-oﬀ between the direct eﬀect of the cost uncertainty work-
ing through the variance of the cost shock and an indirect eﬀect inﬂuencing the variability
of price and the covariance of price with the cost shock. Given w, the expressions for prof-
its of an individual producer under price-taking behavior and under Cournot competition
5For the purposes of this paper, we can use “countries” and “regions” interchangeably.
6Without loss of generality, we develop the argument from the point of view of the Home country.
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are given by π|Price-taking =
1
2β
(p(w)−α−w)2, and π|Cournot =
2b+ β
2(b+ β)2
(p(w)−α−w)2,
respectively.7 So the expressions for expected proﬁts are
E(π|Price-taking) =
1
2β
[
V ar(p)− 2Cov(p, w) + E(p) (E(p)− 2α) + σ2 + α2
]
, (2)
E(π|Cournot) =
2b+ β
2(b+ β)2
[
V ar(p)− 2Cov(p, w) + E(p) (E(p)− 2α) + σ2 + α2
]
. (3)
A higher variance of the cost shock has a direct and positive eﬀect on expected proﬁt.8
However, because the cost shock is a common shock to all ﬁrms in the industry, the
industry price follows the cost shock. Thus, cost uncertainty exerts an indirect eﬀect
working through the product price. Clearly, the expected proﬁt of an individual producer
increases with the variance of price but decreases with the covariance between the price
and the cost shock. For future reference we call this indirect eﬀect of the cost shock on
producer’s expected proﬁt (represented by the sum of the ﬁrst two terms in the right
hand side of equations (2) and (3)) the “variance-covariance eﬀect”. Note also that,
unsurprisingly, the expected proﬁt is also increasing in the expected price.
A move from autarky to trade aﬀects the welfare of consumers and producers and
hence the social welfare as the variability and comovements of price (with the cost shock)
are now aﬀected since the price now depends on the cost shocks of both countries. We
analyze these eﬀects under alternative assumptions about the market structure in the
following two sections.
3. Price-Taking Firms
We ﬁrst consider the case in which the ﬁrms are price takers. Consider autarky ﬁrst.
Given w, the equilibrium in the Home country requires marginal cost to equal price, and
7The expression for π|Price-taking is derived in section 3. To derive the expression for π|Cournot , note
that the ith firm’s problem is: Maximize
{qi}
[a− b(
∑
j qj)− (α+w +
β
2
qi)]qi. The first-order condition for
this problem is: a − b(
∑
j qj) − (α + w +
β
2
qi) = qi(b +
β
2
). Using this we can write qi =
p− α−w
b+ β
,
since p = a − b(
∑
j qj). Finally, we use the first-order condition again to get the expression for profit:
πi = (b+
β
2
)q2i =
2b+ β
2(b+ β)2
(p− α−w)2.
8The intuition is that the firm facing the cost shock is able to adjust output ex post. If output were to
be preset at the profit-maximizing level when the cost shock is at its mean value, the expected profit is
the same as under certainty. However, by optimally adjusting output ex post in response to the realized
cost shocks, the expected profit must increase.
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the equality of demand and supply, that is,
p = α + w + βq,
nq =
1
b
(a− p).
Solving for p yields
p|Autarky =
1
β + bn
[aβ + bn(α + w)].
Given w, the equilibrium proﬁt of a ﬁrm is
π|Autarky =
1
2β
(p− α− w)2 =
β
2(β + bn)2
(a− α− w)2.
Thus, the expected proﬁt is
E(π|Autarky) =
β
2(β + bn)2
[(a− α)2 + σ2].
Also, given w, the consumers’ surplus is
CS|Autarky =
1
2
(a− p)nq =
bn2
2(β + bn)2
(a− α− w)2,
and therefore the expected consumers’ surplus is
E(CS|Autarky) =
bn2
2(β + bn)2
[(a− α)2 + σ2].
Thus, the expected social welfare is
E(SW |Autarky) = nE(π|Autarky) + E(CS|Autarky)
=
n
2(β + bn)
[(a− α)2 + σ2].
Now, consider trade. Given w and w∗, the equilibrium requires
p = α + w + βq,
p = α + w∗ + βq∗,
7
n(q + q∗) =
2
b
(a− p).
Solving for p yields
p|Trade =
1
β + bn
[
aβ +
bn
2
(2α + w + w∗)
]
.
Given w and w∗, the equilibrium proﬁt of a domestic ﬁrm is
π|Trade =
1
2β
(p− α− w)2.
Substituting for p, we get the expected proﬁt from trade to be
E(π|Trade) = E(π|Autarky)
+
bn
8β(β + bn)2
[(4β + bn)σ2 + bnσ∗2 − (4β + 2bn)ρσσ∗].
(4)
It is useful to ﬁrst consider the benchmark case of ρ = 1. If the countries are symmetric
(i.e. σ = σ∗), it is clear that trade will not aﬀect either the variance of price or the
covariance between price and the cost shock for a given country. Thus, no change in the
expected proﬁts from trade will result. However, matters are diﬀerent if the countries are
not symmetric, or if the correlation is imperfect. The following proposition (which follows
from equation (4) and is proved in Appendix A.1) summarizes:
Proposition 1.
1. The gain in expected producers’ surplus under trade is decreasing in ρ for both coun-
tries.
2. For any value of ρ, the expected producers’ surplus is higher under trade than under
autarky for the country with the higher variance of the cost shock.
3. For ρ < 0, the expected producers’ surplus is higher under trade than under autarky
for both countries.
4. For ρ > 0, if ρ2 <
4bn(4β + bn)
(4β + 2bn)2
= 1−
16β2
16β2 + 16βbn+ 4b2n2
, the expected produc-
ers’ surplus is higher under trade than under autarky for both countries.
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5. For ρ > 0,if ρ2 ≥
4bn(4β + bn)
(4β + 2bn)2
= 1−
16β2
16β2 + 16βbn+ 4b2n2
, the expected producers’
surplus is higher under trade than under autarky for both countries if either σ is
suﬃciently close to σ∗ (x2 ≤
σ
σ∗
≤ x3) or σ is suﬃciently diﬀerent from σ
∗ (either
σ
σ∗
≤ x1, or
σ
σ∗
≥ x4).
9
6. If σ = σ∗ = σ¯ and ρ < 1, the gain in expected producers’ surplus under trade is
increasing in σ¯.
Before discussing these results in more detail, some comments are in order. First, it
is worth pointing out that the upper bound on ρ in Proposition 1.3 is increasing in the
number of ﬁrms in each country, n, so that the higher the number of ﬁrms, the more
likely it is that ﬁrms in both countries will beneﬁt from the opening of trade. Secondly,
the upper bound rapidly approaches 1 as n increases (for example, for n = 5, the value
of the upper bound (with β = b = 1) is already 0.918), so that the condition is actually
not very restrictive for price-taking industries with a large number of ﬁrms.
In order to understand the results in Proposition 1 note ﬁrst that the expected price
in equilibrium does not change due to the move from autarky to trade:
E(p|Autarky) =
aβ + bnα
β + bn
= E(p|Trade).
Now, from equation (2), note that, ceteris paribus, a higher variance of the cost shock
(σ2) increases expected proﬁt. However, if the cost shock is a common shock, the product
price follows the cost shock, and lowers expected proﬁts by oﬀsetting the impact of the
variability of the cost shock. This is the “variance-covariance eﬀect”, represented by the
ﬁrst two terms in the bracketed expression in equation (2). Under autarky, their sum is
negative.10 Now suppose that trade opens up,11 and consider the extreme case of ρ = −1.
In this case, there is no ﬂuctuation in the price. The “variance-covariance eﬀect” is zero,
9x1, x2, x3 and x4 are defined in Appendix A.1. Note that
bn
4β + bn
≤ x1 < x2 ≤ 1 ≤ x3 < x4 ≤
4β + bn
bn
, and x1x4 = 1, and x2x3 = 1.
10We have
[
V ar(p|Autarky)− 2Cov(p|Autarky , w)
]
= (
bn
β + bn
)2σ2 −
2bn
β + bn
σ2.
11With trade, we have
[V ar(p|Trade)− 2Cov(p|Trade , w)] =
1
4
(
bn
β + bn
)2(σ2 + σ∗2 + 2ρσσ∗)−
bn
β + bn
(σ2 + ρσσ∗).
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and ﬁrms in both countries are better oﬀ. When both countries have equal variance
of the cost shock, the variance-covariance eﬀect remains unchanged for ρ = 1, and is
decreasing in ρ. Thus, trade always beneﬁts producers relative to autarky in this case of
equal variances.
For the case of unequal variances, trade may increase or decrease price variability
and the covariance between the price and the cost shock for the producers, depending on
whether the country has a lower or higher variance under autarky. Note that
V ar(p|Trade)− V ar(p|Autarky) =
1
4
(
bn
β + bn
)2 (
σ∗2 − 3σ2 + 2ρσσ∗
)
, and
Cov(p|Trade , w)− Cov(p|Autarky , w) =
1
2
(
bn
β + bn
)(
ρσσ∗ − σ2
)
.
Again, to begin with, consider the case of σ = σ∗ = σ¯. We get
[
V ar(p|Trade)− V ar(p|Autarky)
]∣∣∣
σ=σ∗=σ¯
= −
1
2
(
bn
β + bn
)2
σ¯2(1− ρ), and
2
[
Cov(p|Trade , w)−Cov(p|Autarky , w)
]∣∣∣
σ=σ∗=σ¯
= −
(
bn
β + bn
)
σ¯2(1− ρ).
Clearly, trade decreases price variability resulting in a lower producer’s proﬁt. On the
other hand, trade reduces the covariance of price with the cost shock which has a positive
eﬀect on the producer’s proﬁt.
From equation (2), to determine the impact of the switch from autarky to trade on
expected producers’ surplus, it is enough to look at the change in V ar(p) − 2Cov(p)
(since the expected price, E(p), remains unchanged). It is immediate from the above two
expressions that for σ = σ∗ = σ¯,
[V ar(p|Trade)− 2Cov(p|Trade , w)] >
[
V ar(p|Autarky)− 2Cov(p|Autarky , w)
]
.
This explains why producers’ surplus must increase for both countries for the case of
equal variances. Now, suppose that, holding σ∗ ﬁxed, σ is increased from the initial value
of σ = σ∗. It is easy to check that the above inequality will continue to hold for the Home
10
country, which has the higher variance of the cost shock. This implies that Home country
producers will be better oﬀ in the switch from autarky to trade.
Consider consumers’ surplus next. Given w and w∗, the consumers’ surplus under
trade is
CS|Trade =
1
2b
(a− p)2.
Substituting for p, we get the expected consumers’ surplus to be
E(CS|Trade) = E(CS|Autarky)−
bn2
8(β + bn)2
[3σ2 − σ∗2 − 2ρσσ∗). (5)
Again, for the case of equal variances and ρ = 1, we do not expect any change in the
expected consumers’ surplus in either country, since trade keeps both the variance of price
and the covariance of price with the cost shock unaﬀected. This is readily conﬁrmed from
equation (5). For the general case, we can draw the following conclusion about consumers’
surplus using equation (5) (the proof is developed in Appendix A.2).
Proposition 2.
1. The loss in expected consumers’ surplus under trade is decreasing in ρ for both
countries.
2. If σ is suﬃciently close to σ∗, that is, if
√
ρ2 + 3 + ρ
3
<
σ
σ∗
<
√
ρ2 + 3− ρ, then,
for both countries, the expected consumers’ surplus is lower under trade than under
autarky.12 Otherwise, under trade, the expected consumers’ surplus is lower for the
country with the higher variance of the cost shock, and higher for the country with
the lower variance of the cost shock.13
3. If σ = σ∗ = σ¯ and ρ < 1, the loss in expected consumers’ surplus under trade is
increasing in σ¯.
12Note that
√
ρ2 + 3 + ρ
3
≤ 1,
√
ρ2 + 3− ρ ≥ 1 and
(√
ρ2 + 3 + ρ
3
)(√
ρ2 + 3− ρ
)
= 1.
13To be precise, when
σ
σ∗
≤
√
ρ2 + 3 + ρ
3
≤ 1, the expected consumers’ surplus under trade is higher for
the Home country and lower for the Foreign country, and the situation reverses when
σ
σ∗
≥
√
ρ2 + 3−ρ ≥
1.
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Notice that the gap between the lower and upper bounds on
σ
σ∗
in Proposition 2.2
is decreasing in ρ and is zero for ρ = 1. In other words, as the correlation between the
shocks increases, it becomes more likely that at least one of the countries’ consumers will
beneﬁt from trade. However, it is never the case that consumers of both countries will
beneﬁt, that is, even in the limit, when ρ = 1, consumers of the country with the higher
variance of the cost shock are worse oﬀ with trade.
The eﬀect of trade on consumers’ surplus is relatively straightforward to understand.
We know from equation (1) that, expected price remaining the same, consumers’ surplus
increases with the variance of price. With trade the variance of price for the country
with higher variance of the cost shock clearly goes down, and hence the consumers of
this country are worse oﬀ with trade.14 However, the variance of price for the country
with lower variance under autarky may increase, especially if the correlation between the
shocks is high, so that consumers in this country may be better oﬀ after trade. Recall
that the gap between the bounds on
σ
σ∗
in Proposition 2.2 tends to zero as ρ tends to 1,
so that consumers in one of the countries will be better oﬀ in the limit if the variances
are unequal.
Finally, consider social welfare. The expected social welfare under trade is
E(SW |Trade) = nE(π|Trade) + E(CS|Trade)
= E(SW |Autarky) +
bn2
8β(β + bn)
[σ2 + σ∗2 − 2ρσσ∗]. (6)
Since we saw above that for the case of equal variances and ρ = 1, neither the expected
producers’ surplus nor the expected consumers’ surplus change with trade, social welfare
also remains unaﬀected, as is easily conﬁrmed from equation (6). Proposition 3 summa-
rizes the results for the general case.
Proposition 3.
1. Social welfare is higher under trade than autarky for both the Home and the Foreign
country for any value of the parameters σ, σ∗ or ρ, and the increase in social welfare
under trade is decreasing in the correlation coeﬃcient ρ for both countries.
2. When σ = σ∗ = σ¯ and ρ < 1, the gain in social welfare is increasing in σ¯.
14Even in the case of equal variances, as demonstrated earlier, trade decreases price variability, and
hence results in a lower consumer surplus.
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For the case of identical variances and ρ < 1, we know in Propositions 1 and 2
that producers in both countries are better oﬀ with trade, while consumers are worse
oﬀ. Proposition 3, however, says that social welfare improves in both countries. This
perhaps best highlights one major diﬀerence of our analysis from traditional trade theory,
where, under perfect competition, the gains from trade are driven primarily by gains to
consumers. In our setting, gains from trade can accrue to the producers and outweigh
the loss to consumers. As equation (6) reveals, this is true irrespective of whether the
variances are equal or not. Social welfare must be necessarily higher for both countries
under trade.
The intuition for the results on social welfare can be developed in terms of the familiar
“welfare triangles”, as we now show. In Figure 1 we consider the situation from the home
country’s perspective when the eﬀect of trade is to reduce the variance of price. We
assume linear demand and supply curves. There are two possible realizations of the cost
shock, assumed equally likely. The two positions of the supply curve labelled DU and
FT correspond, respectively, to realizations of the positive and negative cost shock in
the home country. We assume that the cost shocks in the home and the foreign country
are perfectly negatively correlated, so that under trade, the home country producers and
consumers face a constant price, given by the height OP.
The expected social surplus under autarky is given by
1
2
(Area DUC + Area FTC).
The expected social surplus under trade is given by
1
2
(Area PRC + Area DQP) +
1
2
(Area PRC + Area FSP).
From Figure 1, it is clear that the gain in social welfare from trade is positive, and
given by
1
2
(Area QUR)+
1
2
(Area RTS)=Area QUR.
It is also easy to check that the expected consumers’ surplus is lower, and the expected
producers’ surplus is higher, under trade.15
15While in Figure 1 we consider the extreme case in which trade eliminates all variability in the product
price, the impact of any reduction in variability is similar.
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In Figure 2, we consider a situation in which the eﬀect of trade is to increase the
variance of price. Under autarky, the home country enjoys a stable price (there are no
cost shocks) given by height OP. Trade introduces variability of price, since the other
country is assumed to experience cost shocks. Expected social surplus under autarky is
given by Area FRC. When trade opens up, the expected social surplus is
1
2
(Area DUC + Area FSD) +
1
2
(Area EWC+ Area FTE).
It is easily checked that the social welfare under trade exceeds that under autarky by
1
2
(Area RSU) +
1
2
(Area TWR) = Area RSU.
Thus, irrespective of whether trade increases or decreases the variability of price for
the home country, social welfare increases.
4. Cournot Competition
In this section, we assume that the ﬁrms are Cournot competitors. A substantial liter-
ature has been developed to address the issues of trade, gains from trade and optimal
trade policies when ﬁrms operate under strategic environments.16 But whether individual
rival ﬁrms from two separate countries themselves beneﬁt from a move from autarky to
free trade has not received much attention until recently. Anderson, Donsimoni and Gab-
szewicz (1989) consider a deterministic environment and show that producers’ surplus in
oligopolistic autarkic industries would be lower under trade due to the “market expansion
eﬀect”. Roughly, trade or market expansion causes ﬁrms to expand output because with
integrated markets, the demand curve facing the ﬁrms is ﬂatter when they can serve both
markets, thereby raising marginal revenue at a given (symmetric) level of output.17 Our
framework diﬀers in that we have uncertainty aﬀecting the marginal cost of production.
The analysis of the previous section (the “variance-covariance eﬀect” in particular) sug-
gests, however, that there should be some oﬀsetting beneﬁts of trade. This is exactly what
we ﬁnd. In a relatively recent contribution Moner-Colonques (1998) addresses the same
16See, for example, Brander and Krugman (1983), Brander and Spencer (1985), Eaton and Gross-
man(1986), Markusen and Venables (1988), Qiu (1994) and Brainard and Martimort (1997), to mention
just a few.
17The Anderson, Donsimoni and Gabszewicz (1989) result also holds if the markets are segmented;
however, the explanation for the result is slightly diﬀerent in this case.
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issue in a game of incomplete information about costs realizations of individual ﬁrms. We
discuss below the diﬀerences of our ﬁndings with that of Moner-Colonques (1998). Unlike
Anderson et al. (1989) or Moner-Colonques (1998), we also look at the eﬀect of trade on
consumers’ surplus and social welfare.
The demand and cost structures are the same as in the basic model. To simplify
calculations, we further assume that b = 1, and β = 0.18
Proceeding as in the last section, we ﬁrst note that E(p|Autarky) =
a + nα
n+ 1
, whereas
E(p|Trade) =
a + 2nα
2n+ 1
. Then
E(p|Trade)− E(p|Autarky) =
n(α− a)
(n+ 1)(2n + 1)
< 0, since a > α.
Thus, unlike price-taking behavior, expected price decreases (and hence output increases)
due to a move from autarky to free trade under strategic behavior. This is the source of
the “market expansion eﬀect”. Clearly, producers are worse-oﬀ due to this eﬀect whereas
the consumers are better-oﬀ.
4.1. Do Firms Benefit From Trade?
In this subsection we address the question whether individual rival ﬁrms from two separate
countries themselves beneﬁt from a move from autarky to free trade. Using equation (3)
(and noting that b = 1, and β = 0) we can decompose the gains from trade for individual
ﬁrms as follows:
E(π|Trade)− E(π|Autarky)
=
[
E(p|Trade) (E(p|Trade)− 2α)−E(p|Autarky)
(
E(p|Autarky)− 2α
)]
+
[
{V ar(p|Trade)− 2Cov(p|Trade , w)} −
{
V ar(p|Autarky)− 2Cov(p|Autarky , w)
}]
.
The decomposition shows the two oﬀsetting eﬀects of free trade at work — the ﬁrst term on
the right-hand-side is the “market expansion eﬀect” and the second one is the “variance-
covariance eﬀect”. What happens to the gains from trade for individual ﬁrms depend on
18Note that we cannot assume β = 0 when the ﬁrms are price takers. The expected proﬁts of the
ﬁrms are then zero under all circumstances. But this problem does not arise when the ﬁrms are Cournot
competitors.
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the relative magnitudes of these two eﬀects. Using the speciﬁcations of the model we can
derive
E(π|Trade)−E(π|Autarky)
= −
(2n2 − 1)(a− α)2
(2n + 1)2(n+ 1)2
+
σ2(2n4 + 8n3 + 8n2 + 4n + 1) + 2σ∗2n2(n+ 1)2 − 4ρσσ∗n(n+ 1)3
(2n + 1)2(n+ 1)2
.
(7)
It is easy to identify that the ﬁrst term involving no uncertainty parameters captures the
“market expansion eﬀect” while the second term is the “variance-covariance eﬀect”. Note
that the “market expansion eﬀect” is negative, that is, individual ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt
decreases under trade. Anderson et al. (1989) arrives at a similar conclusion under a
deterministic environment. But, under cost uncertainty, we have the additional eﬀect —
the “variance-covariance eﬀect” — which can be positive and can dominate the negative
“market expansion eﬀect”.
Since we are interested in ﬁnding conditions when ﬁrms of both the Home and Foreign
countries beneﬁt from trade, let us express their gains in expected producers’ surplus in
the following way:
(2n + 1)2(n+ 1)2
[
E(π|Trade)− E(π|Autarky)
]
Home
= −(2n2 − 1)(a− α)2
(8a)
+σ∗2
[
(2n4 + 8n3 + 8n2 + 4n+ 1)
( σ
σ∗
)2
− 4ρn(n+ 1)3
( σ
σ∗
)
+ 2n2(n+ 1)2
]
,
and
(2n + 1)2(n+ 1)2
[
E(π|Trade)− E(π|Autarky)
]
Foreign
= −(2n2 − 1)(a− α)2
(8b)
+σ∗2
[
2n2(n+ 1)2
( σ
σ∗
)2
− 4ρn(n+ 1)3
( σ
σ∗
)
+ (2n4 + 8n3 + 8n2 + 4n+ 1)
]
.
Let us denote the coeﬃcients of σ∗2 in (8a) and (8b) by V H
( σ
σ∗
)
and V F
( σ
σ∗
)
respec-
tively. For ρ < 0, clearly, both V H
( σ
σ∗
)
and V F
( σ
σ∗
)
are strictly positive . For ρ > 0,
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it is shown in Appendix A.3 that both V H
( σ
σ∗
)
and V F
( σ
σ∗
)
are strictly positive if
ρ2 < 1−
(2n+ 1)2
2 (n+ 1)4
, and when ρ2 ≥ 1 −
(2n + 1)2
2 (n+ 1)4
, they are both strictly positive when
σ is suﬃciently diﬀerent from σ∗ (either
σ
σ∗
< z1 or
σ
σ∗
> z4).
19 For a given
σ
σ∗
, deﬁne,
V
( σ
σ∗
)
= min
{
V H
( σ
σ∗
)
, V F
( σ
σ∗
)}
. If V
( σ
σ∗
)
> 0 and the amount of uncertainty is
suﬃciently high such that σ∗2 >
(2n2 − 1)(a− α)2
V
( σ
σ∗
) , then ﬁrms of both countries beneﬁt
from trade. Proposition 4 summarizes this conclusion:
Proposition 4. When the ﬁrms are Cournot competitors, the expected producers’ surplus
of both Home and Foreign ﬁrms are higher under trade than under autarky if either (i)
ρ < 0 and, for a given
σ
σ∗
, σ∗2 >
(2n2 − 1)(a− α)2
V
( σ
σ∗
) , (ii) ρ > 0, ρ2 < 1 − (2n + 1)2
2 (n+ 1)4
and, for a given
σ
σ∗
, σ∗2 >
(2n2 − 1)(a− α)2
V
( σ
σ∗
) , or (iii) ρ > 0, ρ2 ≥ 1 − (2n+ 1)2
2 (n + 1)4
,
σ is suﬃciently diﬀerent from σ∗ (either
σ
σ∗
< z1 or
σ
σ∗
> z4), and, for a given
σ
σ∗
,
σ∗2 >
(2n2 − 1)(a− α)2
V
( σ
σ∗
) .
Proposition 4 is analogous to Proposition 1.3 — 1.5. Because of the pro-competitive
eﬀect, for producers’ surplus to increase, we need the variance of the cost shocks to be
suﬃciently high and the correlation to be suﬃciently small.20
Notice that the upper bound on ρ2 in part (ii) of the Proposition is increasing in n,
and for n = 1, has a value of 0.718 (i.e., the condition holds for |ρ| < 0.8488). However,
since the numerator and denominator of the lower bound on σ2 both depend on n, we
cannot immediately conclude that the condition is more likely to hold if n is larger.
We can get more precise conditions if we further assume that the variances of the cost
19z1 and z4 are deﬁned in Appendix A.3.
20Another diﬀerence is that for the price-taking case, if the variances of the cost shocks are suﬃciently
close, both countries beneﬁt from trade. This is true in the Cournot case only if the correlation coeﬃcient
is less than the upper bound given in part (ii) of Proposition 4.
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shocks are identical: σ = σ∗ = σ¯. Then the expected gain from trade becomes
[
E(π|Trade)− E(π|Autarky)
]∣∣∣
σ=σ∗=σ¯
=
−(2n2 − 1)(a− α)2 + σ¯2 [4n(n+ 1)3(1− ρ)− (2n2 − 1)]
(2n+ 1)2(n+ 1)2
.
(9)
The following proposition now follows from equation (9).
Proposition 5. When the ﬁrms are Cournot competitors and σ = σ∗ = σ¯, the expected
producers’ surplus of both Home and Foreign ﬁrms are higher under trade than under
autarky if and only if (i) ρ < 1−
2n2 − 1
4n(n+ 1)3
and (ii) σ¯2 >
(2n2 − 1)(a− α)2
4n(n + 1)3(1− ρ)− (2n2 − 1)
.
It turns out that the expressions in the right hand side of Proposition 5 (i) decreases
slightly as n goes from n = 1 to n = 2, and then increase monotonically with n. Exactly
the opposite is true for the expression in the right hand side of Proposition 5 (ii), which
increases from n = 1 to n = 2, and then decreases monotonically in n. Thus, in the
symmetric case, as the number of ﬁrms in each industry increases beyond the duopoly
case of n = 2, it is more likely that ﬁrms in both countries will beneﬁt from the switch to
trade.
In Proposition 5, we need the correlation coeﬃcient to be suﬃciently smaller than 1
and the variances of the cost shocks to be suﬃciently high for the gain to the producers
from the “variance-covariance eﬀect” to dominate the loss from the “market expansion
eﬀect”. Our earlier discussion on how the “variance-covariance eﬀect” aﬀects expected
proﬁt is useful in understanding the various eﬀects at work. In the price-taking case,
note that, for ρ < 1, the net gains in expected proﬁt due to the “variance-covariance
eﬀect” is positive and increasing in σ¯2.21 Thus, the gains from trade due to the “variance-
covariance eﬀect” exist if and only if the correlation is less than perfect, and increase in the
common variance of the cost shock. In the Cournot case considered in Proposition 5, the
21Recall that when ﬁrms are price takers, we have:
[V ar(p|Trade)− 2Cov(p|Trade , w)]−
[
V ar(p|Autarky)− 2Cov(p|Autarky , w)
]
= −
1
2
(
bn
β + bn
)2
σ¯2(1− ρ) +
(
bn
β + bn
)
σ¯2(1− ρ).
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conditions necessary for gains from trade are similar to the price -taking case. So long as
the correlation is not too close to one, the gain from trade from the “variance-covariance
eﬀect” can outweigh the loss due to the “market expansion eﬀect” if the variance of the
shock is suﬃciently high.
It is interesting to compare our ﬁndings with that of Moner-Colonques (1998). He
shows that in the presence of private cost information, the expected proﬁt of an oligopolis-
tic ﬁrm is higher under free trade than under autarky when there exists a suﬃciently large
amount of uncertainty and a certain degree of ﬁrms’ heterogeneity. We do not need any
asymmetry of information for our result. We also need uncertainty to be suﬃciently
large, but that is to strengthen the “variance-covariance eﬀect”, which is quite intuitive.
Interestingly, in Moner-Colonques’ analysis, the ﬁrms of at least one country prefer to
operate under autarky rather than under free trade, for the particular case of symmetry
both in demand and industry sizes, whereas this symmetric case is precisely what we have
considered in Proposition 5.
4.2. Gains in Consumers’ Surplus and Social Welfare
Now we analyze the eﬀect of trade on consumers’ surplus and social welfare. Consider
consumers’ surplus ﬁrst. From equation (1) it is clear that gains in consumers’ surplus
depend on the relative magnitudes of the “market expansion eﬀect” and the eﬀect of price
variability on consumers’ surplus. Using the model speciﬁcations we get the expression
for the gain in consumers’ surplus as
E(CS|Trade)−E(CS|Autarky)
=
n2(4n+ 3)(a− α)2
2(2n+ 1)2(n + 1)2
+
n2 [(n+ 1)2(σ∗2 + 2ρσσ∗)− n(3n + 2)σ2]
2(2n+ 1)2(n+ 1)2
.
(10)
The ﬁrst term represents the eﬀect of market expansion and the second term captures
the impact of price variability. Not surprisingly, market expansion and the associated
increase in production tends to increase the consumers’ surplus. However, trade may
reduce the variance of price and the oﬀsetting eﬀect of lower price variability tends to
lower consumers’ surplus. Proposition 6 summarizes the results for gains in consumers’
surplus that follow from equation (10) and is proved in Appendix A.4.
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Proposition 6. When the ﬁrms are Cournot competitors,
1. The expected consumers’ surplus is lower under trade than under autarky for both
countries if and only if ρ <
2n2 − 1
2(n+ 1)2
, σ is suﬃciently close to σ∗, 22 and, for a
given
σ
σ∗
, σ∗2 is suﬃciently high.23
2. For any value of ρ, if σ is suﬃciently diﬀerent from σ∗, 24 the expected consumers’
surplus under trade is (i) higher for the country with the lower variance of the cost
shock and (ii) lower for the country with the higher variance of the cost shock if, for
a given
σ
σ∗
, σ∗2 is suﬃciently high.25
These results mirror the results in Proposition 2.2 for the price-taking case. One
diﬀerence is that, because of the pro-competitive eﬀect, we need the variance of the costs
shocks to be suﬃciently high for consumer welfare to decrease following trade.
Several comments are in order. First, from Proposition 6.1, the value of ρ necessary
for consumers’ surplus to increase following trade in at least one country is not high for
the monopoly or the duopoly cases (the upper bound is 0.389 for n = 2). However, when
the correlation is close to zero (or negative) , and the variances are similar in magnitude
and suﬃciently high, consumers’ surplus will decrease in both countries with the switch
from autarky to trade.26 Finally, holding the variance of one of the countries (say the
Home country) unchanged, as the variance of the Foreign country increases suﬃciently,
consumers’ surplus will increase in the home country but decrease in the foreign country.
22Speciﬁcally, σ
σ∗
need to lie in an interval (s, s∗), where s and s∗ are deﬁned in Appendix A.4, and it
is shown that s < 1 and s∗ > 1 when ρ <
2n2 − 1
2(n+ 1)2
.
23Speciﬁcally, σ∗2 >
(4n+ 3)(a− α)2
S
( σ
σ∗
) , where S(·) is deﬁned in Appendix A.4.
24That is, if
σ
σ∗
/∈ [s, s], where s, s are deﬁned in Appendix A.4, and s ≤ 1 and s ≥ 1.
25Speciﬁcally, σ∗2 >
(4n+ 3)(a− α)2∣∣∣Si
( σ
σ∗
)∣∣∣
, where Si
( σ
σ∗
)
is deﬁned in Appendix A.4, i being the index
for the country with the higher variance of the cost shock.
26Only if the correlation is perfect (ρ = 1) and the variance of the shock the same will the variability of
the price remain unchanged after trade for both countries. Otherwise, price variability will decline (when
the variances are the same for both countries), and consumers may be worse oﬀ.
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Once again, the conditions can be made more precise when σ = σ∗ = σ¯. In that case,
the gain in consumers’ surplus from trade is[
E(CS|Trade)−E(CS|Autarky)
]∣∣∣
σ=σ∗=σ¯
=
n2 [(4n + 3)(a− α)2 − σ¯2 {n(3n+ 2)− (n+ 1)2(1 + 2ρ)}]
2(2n + 1)2(n+ 1)2
.
(11)
Now we can draw the following conclusion that follows from equation (11).
Proposition 7: When the ﬁrms are Cournot competitors and σ = σ∗ = σ¯, the expected
consumers’ surplus is lower under trade than under autarky if and only if ρ <
2n2 − 1
2(n+ 1)2
and σ¯2 >
(4n+ 3)(a− α)2
n(3n + 2)− (n+ 1)2(1 + 2ρ)
.
Finally, we compare social welfare under autarky and trade. For a wide range of values
for the variance of the cost shock, once again, remarkably, social welfare is higher in both
countries under trade than under autarky, for all values of the correlation coeﬃcient.
But, interestingly, we can pin down the precise conditions under which social welfare may
become lower under trade than under autarky.
The expected social welfare gain under trade is
E(SW |Trade)− E(SW |Autarky)
=
n
2 (n + 1)2 (2n + 1)2
[(a− α)2 (3n+ 2) + σ2 (4n4 + 13n3 + 14n2 + 8n + 2)
−2nρσσ∗ (4n + 3) (n+ 1)2 + nσ∗2 (4n+ 1) (n + 1)2].
(12)
Like the expected producers’ surplus and consumers’ surplus, the gain in social welfare
also is aﬀected by the two eﬀects of market expansion and price variability. It is clear
from equation (12) that the net eﬀect of market expansion on social welfare is positive.
For a wide range of parameter values, the impact of trade on the variability of price and
its covariability with the cost-shock in fact reinforces this positive eﬀect. When n is large,
given our results from the price-taking case, this is exactly what we would expect. In fact,
for ρ = 1, the expression representing the “variance-covariance eﬀect” in equation (12),
σ2
[
(4n4 + 13n3 + 14n2 + 8n + 2)
n (4n + 1) (n+ 1)2
− 2
(
σ∗
σ
)
(4n+ 3)
4n+ 1
+
(
σ∗
σ
)2]
, converges to a perfect
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square (for given
σ∗
σ
= 1) as n approaches inﬁnity. This parallels the results of Proposition
3 (see equation (6)). Nonetheless, for ﬁnite n, it is possible for the expression to be
negative.27 If the correlation coeﬃcient is suﬃciently close to 1, and the variance of the
cost shock is suﬃciently high for the home country, the loss in social welfare due to the
impact of trade on the variability of price and its covariability with the cost shock may
outweigh the gain from the market expansion eﬀect. However, as the next Proposition
shows, the range of parameter values for which this can happen is still quite small.
Proposition 8.
1. The expected social welfare gain is monotonically decreasing in ρ for both countries.
2. For any value of ρ, social welfare under trade is higher than under autarky for the
country with the higher variance of the cost shock.
3. For any value of ρ, social welfare under trade is higher for both countries if either
σ
σ∗
≤
4n+ 1
4n+ 5
, or
σ
σ∗
≥
4n + 5
4n + 1
.
4. When ρ2 < 1−
(n− 2) (2n + 1)2
n (4n+ 3)2 (n+ 1)2
, the expected social welfare under trade is higher
for both countries.
5. When ρ2 ≥ 1−
(n− 2) (2n + 1)2
n (4n+ 3)2 (n+ 1)2
, the expected social welfare under trade is higher
for both countries if either σ is suﬃciently close to σ∗ (t2 ≤
σ
σ∗
≤ t3) or σ is
suﬃciently diﬀerent from σ∗ (either
σ
σ∗
≤ t1, or
σ
σ∗
≥ t4).
28 Otherwise, the expected
social welfare under trade is higher for the country with the higher variance of the
cost shock, and it is higher for the country with the lower variance of the cost shock
if, for a given
σ
σ∗
, σ∗2 <
(3n+ 2) (a− α)2∣∣∣W i ( σ
σ∗
)∣∣∣ , where i is the index for the country with
the lower variance of the cost shock.29
27To see this, note that for given n, the value of σ
∗
σ
that minimizes the expression is σ
∗
σ
= (4n+3)4n+1 .
Substituting this value into the above expression, one can check that the expression is negative for
n > 2, although it rapidly approaches zero as n increases. In other words, if the correlation coeﬃcient is
suﬃciently close to 1, for every n > 2, one can ﬁnd σ
∗
σ
such that the expression is negative.
28t1, t2, t3 and t4 are deﬁned in Appendix A.5. Note that
4n+ 1
4n+ 5
≤ t1 < t2 ≤ 1 ≤ t3 < t4 ≤
4n+ 5
4n+ 1
.
29For the deﬁnition of W i (·) , i = H, F, see Appendix A.5.
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6. Immiserizing Trade: Social welfare under trade is lower than that under autarky
(i) for the Home country if and only if ρ2 ≥ 1−
(n− 2) (2n + 1)2
n (4n+ 3)2 (n+ 1)2
, t1 ≤
σ
σ∗
≤ t2,
and, for a given
σ
σ∗
, σ∗2 >
(3n+ 2) (a− α)2∣∣∣WH ( σ
σ∗
)∣∣∣ , and (ii) for the Foreign country if
and only if ρ2 ≥ 1 −
(n− 2) (2n + 1)2
n (4n+ 3)2 (n+ 1)2
, t3 ≤
σ
σ∗
≤ t4, and, for a given
σ
σ∗
,
σ∗2 >
(3n+ 2) (a− α)2∣∣∣W F ( σ
σ∗
)∣∣∣ .
Unlike Proposition 3, social welfare is not always higher for both countries under trade
than under autarky when there is Cournot competition. However, it is still higher for both
countries for a wide range of parameter values. Notice that unless the shocks are highly
correlated, the condition in Proposition 8.6 is not going to be met. The minimum value
of the upper bound occurs for n = 3 and is 0. 995. Even when this condition is met, for
social welfare to decrease, the ratio of the variance of the shocks must not be very close to
or very far away from 1, and the variances must be suﬃciently high. It is also clear from
the conditions on t1, t2, t3, t4 and Proposition 8.6 that both countries cannot be worse oﬀ
from trade. The underlying reason why social welfare increases in the Cournot case except
under very tight parameter conﬁgurations is much the same as in the price-taking case
where it always increases. Imperfect competition may prevent arbitrage opportunities to
be completely exploited; nonetheless, at least in our linear model, the gains from trade
seem surprisingly robust.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we show that trade can aﬀect the welfare of countries in the presence of
arbitrage opportunities as it aﬀects the exposure of the countries to uncertainty. Pro-
ducers’ surplus is aﬀected due to the “variance-covariance” eﬀect. Consumers are also
aﬀected as the variability of product prices changes. Depending on the variances of the
shocks, the correlation between the shocks and the number of ﬁrms, producers’ and con-
sumers’ surplus in a given country can be either higher or lower with trade than under
23
autarky. However, social welfare is higher in both countries under a surprisingly robust
set of conditions, both when the ﬁrms are price-takers or Cournot competitors.
6. Appendix
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1.
Consider a Home country ﬁrm ﬁrst. Equation (4) can be rewritten as
[
E(π|Trade)− E(π|Autarky)
]
Home
=
bnσ∗2
8β(β + bn)2
[
(4β + bn)
( σ
σ∗
)2
− (4β + 2bn)ρ
( σ
σ∗
)
+ bn
]
.
Consider the quadratic expression
(4β + bn)
( σ
σ∗
)2
− (4β + 2bn)ρ
( σ
σ∗
)
+ bn. (A.1)
This expression is strictly convex in
σ
σ∗
and its minimum value is
4bn(4β + bn)− (4β + 2bn)2ρ2
4(4β + bn)
. It follows that, for a Home country ﬁrm, E(π|Trade) >
E(π|Autarky) when ρ
2 <
4bn(4β + bn)
(4β + 2bn)2
.
When ρ2 ≥
4bn(4β + bn)
(4β + 2bn)2
, (A.1) can be expressed as
(4β + bn)
( σ
σ∗
)2
− (4β + 2bn)ρ
( σ
σ∗
)
+ bn = (4β + bn)
( σ
σ∗
− x1
)( σ
σ∗
− x2
)
,
where x1 =
(4β + 2bn)ρ−
√
(4β + 2bn)2ρ2 − 4bn(4β + bn)
2(4β + bn)
and
x2 =
(4β + 2bn)ρ +
√
(4β + 2bn)2ρ2 − 4bn(4β + bn)
2(4β + bn)
. It is easy to check that
bn
4β + bn
≤
x1 < x2 ≤ 1. Now it follows that, if ρ
2 ≥
4bn(4β + bn)
(4β + 2bn)2
,
[
E(π|Trade)− E(π|Autarky)
]
Home


≥ 0, when
σ
σ∗
≤ x1,
< 0, when x1 <
σ
σ∗
< x2,
≥ 0, when
σ
σ∗
≥ x2.
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Now consider a Foreign ﬁrm. By symmetry, it follows from equation (4) that
[
E(π|Trade)− E(π|Autarky)
]
Foreign
bn
8β(β + bn)2
[(4β + bn)σ∗2 + bnσ2 − (4β + 2bn)ρσσ∗]
=
bnσ∗2
8β(β + bn)2
[
bn
( σ
σ∗
)2
− (4β + 2bn)ρ
( σ
σ∗
)
+ (4β + bn)
]
.
Consider the quadratic expression
bn
( σ
σ∗
)2
− (4β + 2bn)ρ
( σ
σ∗
)
+ (4β + bn). (A.2)
This expression is also strictly convex in
σ
σ∗
with a minimum value of
4bn(4β + bn)− (4β + 2bn)2ρ2
4bn
. Thus, for a Foreign ﬁrm also E(π|Trade) > E(π|Autarky)
when ρ2 <
4bn(4β + bn)
(4β + 2bn)2
.
When ρ2 ≥
4bn(4β + bn)
(4β + 2bn)2
, (A.2) can be expressed as
bn
( σ
σ∗
)2
− (4β + 2bn)ρ
( σ
σ∗
)
+ (4β + bn) = bn
( σ
σ∗
− x3
)( σ
σ∗
− x4
)
,
where x3 =
(4β + 2bn)ρ−
√
(4β + 2bn)2ρ2 − 4bn(4β + bn)
2bn
and
x4 =
(4β + 2bn)ρ+
√
(4β + 2bn)2ρ2 − 4bn(4β + bn)
2bn
. It is easy to check that 1 ≤ x3 <
x4 ≤
4β + bn
bn
.30 Hence it follows that, if ρ2 ≥
4bn(4β + bn)
(4β + 2bn)2
,
[
E(π|Trade)− E(π|Autarky)
]
Foreign


≥ 0, when
σ
σ∗
≤ x3,
< 0, when x3 <
σ
σ∗
< x4,
≥ 0, when
σ
σ∗
≥ x4.
30Also, note that x1x4 = 1, and x2x3 = 1.
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Thus, when ρ2 <
4bn(4β + bn)
(4β + 2bn)2
, the expected producers’ surplus is higher under
trade than under autarky for ﬁrms in both countries (Proposition 1.4). When ρ2 ≥
4bn(4β + bn)
(4β + 2bn)2
, the expected producers’ surplus is higher under trade than under autarky
for ﬁrms in both countries if either σ is suﬃciently close to σ∗ (that is, x2 ≤
σ
σ∗
≤ x3) or
σ is suﬃciently diﬀerent from σ∗ (that is, either
σ
σ∗
≤ x1, or
σ
σ∗
≥ x4); otherwise, when
x1 <
σ
σ∗
< x2, Home ﬁrms suﬀer a loss in producers’ surplus while Foreign ﬁrms enjoy a
gain, and the situation reverses when x3 <
σ
σ∗
< x4 (Proposition 1.5).
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Proposition 1.3 now follows from Propositions 1.4 and 1.5. 
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2.
From equation (5) it follows that
[
E(CS|Trade)−E(CS|Autarky)
]
Home
= −
bn2
8(β + bn)2
[3σ2 − σ∗2 − 2ρσσ∗)
= −
bn2σ∗2
8(β + bn)2
[
3
( σ
σ∗
)2
− 2ρ
( σ
σ∗
)
− 1
]
= −
3bn2σ∗2
8(β + bn)2
( σ
σ∗
− y1
)( σ
σ∗
− y2
)
,
where y1 =
ρ−
√
ρ2 + 3
3
and y2 =
ρ +
√
ρ2 + 3
3
. Since y1 =
ρ−
√
ρ2 + 3
3
< 0 for −1 ≤
ρ ≤ 1, and
σ
σ∗
≥ 0, we can conclude that
[
E(CS|Trade)− E(CS|Autarky)
]
Home
 0 according as σ
σ∗
 ρ +
√
ρ2 + 3
3
.
31Recall that
bn
4β + bn
≤ x1 < x2 ≤ 1 ≤ x3 < x4 ≤
4β + bn
bn
.
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For the Foreign country we can similarly show that
[
E(CS|Trade)−E(CS|Autarky)
]
Foreign
= −
bn2
8(β + bn)2
[3σ∗2 − σ2 − 2ρσσ∗)
=
bn2σ∗2
8(β + bn)2
[( σ
σ∗
)2
+ 2ρ
( σ
σ∗
)
− 3
]
=
bn2σ∗2
8(β + bn)2
( σ
σ∗
− y3
)( σ
σ∗
− y4
)
,
where y3 = −ρ −
√
ρ2 + 3, and y4 = −ρ +
√
ρ2 + 3. Since y3 = −ρ −
√
ρ2 + 3 < 0 for
−1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, and
σ
σ∗
≥ 0, we can conclude that
[
E(CS|Trade)− E(CS|Autarky)
]
Foreign
 0 according as σ
σ∗
 −ρ+
√
ρ2 + 3.
Now Proposition 2.2 follows. 
A.3. Proof of Proposition 4.
We have
V H
( σ
σ∗
)
= (2n4 + 8n3 + 8n2 + 4n+ 1)
( σ
σ∗
)2
− 4ρn(n+ 1)3
( σ
σ∗
)
+ 2n2(n+ 1)2, and
V F
( σ
σ∗
)
= 2n2(n + 1)2
( σ
σ∗
)2
− 4ρn(n + 1)3
( σ
σ∗
)
+ (2n4 + 8n3 + 8n2 + 4n + 1).
Both V H
( σ
σ∗
)
and V F
( σ
σ∗
)
are strictly convex in
σ
σ∗
, and their minimum values are
min{ σ
σ∗
≥0
} V H
( σ
σ∗
)
= (2n4 + 8n3 + 8n2 + 4n + 1)− 2 (n + 1)4 ρ2, and
min{ σ
σ∗
≥0
} V F
( σ
σ∗
)
=
2n2 (n+ 1)2
[
(2n4 + 8n3 + 8n2 + 4n+ 1)− 2 (n + 1)4 ρ2
]
2n4 + 8n3 + 8n2 + 4n+ 1
.
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Clearly, both V H
( σ
σ∗
)
and V F
( σ
σ∗
)
are strictly positive when
ρ2 <
2n4 + 8n3 + 8n2 + 4n + 1
2 (n + 1)4
= 1−
(2n + 1)2
2 (n+ 1)4
.
When ρ2 ≥ 1 −
(2n+ 1)2
2 (n+ 1)4
, proceeding as in subsection A.1, V H
( σ
σ∗
)
and V F
( σ
σ∗
)
can be written as
V H
( σ
σ∗
)
= (2n4 + 8n3 + 8n2 + 4n+ 1)
( σ
σ∗
− z1
)( σ
σ∗
− z2
)
, and
V F
( σ
σ∗
)
= 2n2(n+ 1)2
( σ
σ∗
− z3
)( σ
σ∗
− z4
)
,
where z1 and z2 (z1 < z2) are the roots of the quadratic equation V
H
( σ
σ∗
)
= 0, and z3
and z4 (z3 < z4) are the roots of the quadratic equation V
F
( σ
σ∗
)
= 0. It can be checked
that z1z4 = 1 and z2z3 = 1, and z1 < z3 and z2 < z4. Now we can conclude that both
V H
( σ
σ∗
)
and V F
( σ
σ∗
)
are strictly positive if either
σ
σ∗
< z1 or
σ
σ∗
> z4. 
A.4. Proof of Proposition 6.
Using equation (10) we can express the gains in consumers’ surplus for the Home and the
Foreign country as follows:
2(2n+ 1)2(n+ 1)2
n2
[
E(CS|Trade)− E(CS|Autarky)
]
Home
(A.3)
= (4n+ 3)(a− α)2 + σ∗2
[
−n(3n + 2)
( σ
σ∗
)2
+ 2ρ(n+ 1)2
( σ
σ∗
)
+ (n+ 1)2
]
, and
2(2n+ 1)2(n+ 1)2
n2
[
E(CS|Trade)− E(CS|Autarky)
]
Foreign
= (4n + 3)(a− α)2 + σ∗2
[
(n + 1)2
( σ
σ∗
)2
+ 2ρ(n+ 1)2
( σ
σ∗
)
− n(3n+ 2)
]
.
(A.4)
Let us denote the coeﬃcients of σ∗2 in (A.3) and (A.4) by SH
( σ
σ∗
)
and SF
( σ
σ∗
)
respec-
tively. Proceeding as in subsection A.2, we can show that
SH
( σ
σ∗
)
 0 according as σ
σ∗

2ρ (n+ 1)2 + 2
√
(n+ 1)4 ρ2 + n (3n + 2) (n+ 1)2
2n (3n + 2)
≡ s, and
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SF
( σ
σ∗
)
 0 according as σ
σ∗

−2ρ (n + 1)2 + 2
√
(n + 1)4 ρ2 + n (3n+ 2) (n+ 1)2
2 (n+ 1)2
≡ s∗.
Note that ss∗ = 1. Also, it can be checked that (i) s < 1 and s∗ > 1 when ρ <
2n2 − 1
2(n + 1)2
,
and (ii) s ≥ 1 and s∗ ≤ 1 when ρ ≥
2n2 − 1
2(n + 1)2
. For any value of ρ, deﬁne, s = min {s, s∗} ,
and s = max {s, s∗} .Also, for a given
σ
σ∗
, deﬁne, S
( σ
σ∗
)
= min
{∣∣∣SH ( σ
σ∗
)∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣SF ( σ
σ∗
)∣∣∣} .
Now the conclusions in Proposition 6 follow.
A.5. Proof of Proposition 8.
Using equation (12) we can write the expressions for social welfare gains under trade for
the Home and Foreign country as follows:
2(2n+ 1)2(n + 1)2
n
[
E(SW |Trade)− E(SW |Autarky)
]
Home
= (3n+ 2)(a− α)2
+σ∗2
[
(4n4 + 13n3 + 14n2 + 8n+ 2)
( σ
σ∗
)2
−2nρ (4n + 3) (n+ 1)2
( σ
σ∗
)
+ n (4n + 1) (n+ 1)2
]
, and
(A.5)
2(2n+ 1)2(n+ 1)2
n
[
E(SW |Trade)− E(SW |Autarky)
]
Foreign
= (3n+ 2)(a− α)2
+σ∗2
[
n (4n+ 1) (n + 1)2
( σ
σ∗
)2
− 2nρ (4n+ 3) (n + 1)2
( σ
σ∗
)
+(4n4 + 13n3 + 14n2 + 8n+ 2)
]
.
(A.6)
Let us denote the coeﬃcients of σ∗2 in (A.5) and (A.6) by WH
( σ
σ∗
)
and WF
( σ
σ∗
)
respectively. It can be checked that both WH
( σ
σ∗
)
and W F
( σ
σ∗
)
are strictly positive
when ρ2 < 1−
(n− 2) (2n + 1)2
n (4n+ 3)2 (n+ 1)2
.
When ρ2 ≥ 1−
(n− 2) (2n+ 1)2
n (4n + 3)2 (n + 1)2
, WH
( σ
σ∗
)
and WF
( σ
σ∗
)
can be written as
WH
( σ
σ∗
)
=
(
4n4 + 13n3 + 14n2 + 8n + 2
) ( σ
σ∗
− t1
)( σ
σ∗
− t2
)
, and
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W F
( σ
σ∗
)
= n (4n + 1) (n+ 1)2
( σ
σ∗
− t3
)( σ
σ∗
− t4
)
,
where t1 and t2 (t1 < t2) are the roots of the quadratic equation W
H
( σ
σ∗
)
= 0, and t3
and t4 (t3 < t4) are the roots of the quadratic equation W
F
( σ
σ∗
)
= 0. It can be checked
that t1t4 = 1 and t2t3 = 1, and
4n+ 1
4n+ 5
≤ t1 < t2 ≤ 1 ≤ t3 < t4 ≤
4n+ 5
4n+ 1
. Now it follows
that, when ρ2 ≥ 1−
(n− 2) (2n + 1)2
n (4n+ 3)2 (n+ 1)2
,
WH
( σ
σ∗
)


≥ 0, when
σ
σ∗
≤ t1,
< 0, when t1 <
σ
σ∗
< t2,
≥ 0, when
σ
σ∗
≥ t2;
and
WF
( σ
σ∗
)


≥ 0, when
σ
σ∗
≤ t3,
< 0, when t3 <
σ
σ∗
< t4,
≥ 0, when
σ
σ∗
≥ t4.
Note that, since t1 < t2 ≤ 1 ≤ t3 < t4, both W
H
( σ
σ∗
)
and W F
( σ
σ∗
)
can never be
negative simultaneously. Now Proposition 8 follows. 
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